Lars Ehlers joined the Université de Montréal in 2001. He earned his PhD in Economics at the University of Maastricht in 2001, after graduating in Mathematics from the University of Aachen, in 1997.

He is an elected member of the Council of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare and a member of the Board of the Society for Economic Design.

In the 2003 SSHRC Standard Research Grants competition, his research proposal was ranked first in Canada. In 2012, the Society for Social Choice and Welfare awarded him the 6th Social Choice and Welfare Prize. He is the organizer of the Microeconomic Theory Group at CIREQ.

At present, his research deals with the manipulation of matching mechanisms on labour markets, the assignment of indivisible objects and externalities in cooperative environments.

Lars Ehlers est arrivé à l'Université de Montréal en 2001. Il a obtenu son Ph.D. en économie à l'université de Maastricht en 2001 et il a été diplômé en mathématiques de l'université de technologie de Aachen en 1997.

Il est président élu de la Society for Economic Design (2016-2022), membre élu du Council of the Game Theory Society, et membre élu du Council of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare. Lors de la compétition pour les Subventions ordinaires de recherche 2003 du CRSH, sa proposition de recherche a été classée première au Canada.

En 2021, la Société canadienne en science économique (SCSE) lui a attribué le Prix Marcel-Dagenais pour une contribution marquante à la vie scientifique économique en français au Canada. En 2012, the Society for Social Choice and Welfare lui a décerné le 6e Social Choice and Welfare Prize. Il est responsable du groupe théorie microéconomique au CIREQ.

Il est éditeur associé de Games and Economic Behavior (à partir de 2021), Review of Economic Design (à partir de 2011), Social Choice and Welfare (à partir de 2007), Journal of Mechanism Design and Institutions (à partir de 2016) et Notas Económicas (à partir de 2020).

• " Top Trading with Fixed Tie-Breaking in Markets with Indivisible Goods ", Journal of Economic Theory 151, 2014, 64-87.
• " Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability ", Theoretical Economics 9, 2014, 64-87 (avec T. Andersson et L.-G. Svensson).
• " Strategy-Proofness makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities ", Mathematics of Operations Research 39, 2014, 949-966 (avec B. Klaus).
• " School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds ", Journal of Economic Theory 154, 2014, 648-683 (avec I.E. Hafalir, M.B. Yenmez et M.A. Yilidrim).
• " Matching Markets under (In)complete Information ", Journal of Economic Theory 157, 2015, 295-317 (avec J. Massó).
• " Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance: Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics ", Games and Economic Behavior 97, 2016, 128-146 (avec B. Klaus).
• " Regulation via the Polluter-Pays Principle ", Economic Journal 126, 2016, 884-906 (avec S. Ambec).
• " Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Market Design Approach ", Journal of Economic Theory 165, 2016, 643-671 (avec T. Andersson et L.-G. Svensson).
•  “Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores Revisited,” Journal of Economic Theory 176 (2018): 393—407.
• “Strategy-Proof Tie-Breaking in Matching with Priorities,” avec A. Westkamp, Theoretical Economics 13 (2018): 1009—1042.
• “Continuity and Incentive Compatibility in Cardinal Mechanisms,” avec D. Majumdar, D. Mishra et A. Sen, Journal of Mathematical Economics 88 (2020): 31—41.
• “Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient Stable Maximum Matchings,” avec T. Andersson, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 122 (2020): 937—965.
• “(Il)legal Assignments in School Choice,” avec T. Morrill,Review of Economic Studies 87 (2020): 1837—1875.
• “Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets,” avec T. Andersson, Á. Cseh and A. Erlanson, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13 (2021): 338—373.
• “Minimally Unstable Pareto Improvement over the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism,” avec B. Doğan, Theoretical Economics 16 (2021): 1249—1279.
• “An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities,” avec T. Andersson, International Journal of Economic Theory 18 (2022): 50—60 (Special Issue in honor of W. Thomson).
• “Robust Minimal Instability of the Top-Trading Cycles Mechanism,” avec B. Doğan, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 14 (2022): 556—582.
• “Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses,” avec T. Andersson, L.-G. Svensson, et R. Tierney, Mathematics of Operations Research 47 (2022): 3110—3128.
• “Normative Properties for Object Allocation Problems: Characterizations and Trade-offs,” with B. Klaus, Chapter 10 in “Online and Matching-Based Market Design” (eds. F. Echenique, N. Immorlica et V.V. Vazirani), Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
• “Three Public Goods and Lexicographic Preferences:  Preferences: Replacement Principle,” Review of Economic Design 26 (2022): 367—384 (Special Issue in honor of S. Koray).
• " School Choice with Control " (http//cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/13-2010-cah.pdf) ", 2010
• " Externalities and the Nucleolus ", 2017 (avec M. Álvarez-Munos).
• “Robust Design in Monotonic Matching Markets: A Case for Firm-Proposing Deferred-Acceptance,” avec J. Massó, May 2018. Lien: https://cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/04-2018-cah.pdf
• “Dynamic Refugee Matching,” avec T. Andersson et A. Martinello, October 2018. https://cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/22-2018-cah.pdf
• “Non-Manipulable House Exchange under (Minimum) Equilibrium Prices,” avec T. Andersson et L.-G. Svensson, December 2020.Lien: https://cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/01-2021-cah.pdf
• “Strategy-Proof and Envyfree Random Assignment,” avec C. Basteck, December 2020. Lien: https://cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/02-2021-cah.pdf
• “Student-Optimal Interdistrict School Choice: District-Based versus School-Based Admissions,” November 2022). https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/handle/1866/27761
• "On the constrained efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment" avec C. Basteck, April 2023 https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/handle/1866/27983

• “ Respecting Improvement in Markets with Indivisible Goods” Septembre 2023 https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1866/28758/RI2023.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y